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UNITED STATES V. LARA— 
FEDERAL POWERS COUCHED IN TERMS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
AND A RELAXATION OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS 
DAVID P. WEBER* 
 
“[T]he tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, 
and our federal Indian† law cases untenably hold 
both positions simultaneously.”1 
 
Imagine the following scenario: a non-Indian resident of Minnesota, a 
member of the Cherokee tribe residing in Oklahoma, who is visiting South 
Dakota for the first time, and a member of the Oglala Sioux tribe are 
traveling together through the Oglala member’s reservation in South 
Dakota.  There they find themselves in an encounter with federal officers.  
The situation quickly escalates, and ultimately the three passengers trade 
blows with the federal officers. 
Under these facts, the Oglala member would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of his tribe as well as to the jurisdiction of the U.S. government 
and can be tried by both under the doctrine of dual sovereignty.2  The non-
Indian Minnesotan is not subject to tribal jurisdiction and will only be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government.  Interestingly, the 
resident of the state of Oklahoma, who is also classified as an Indian, is 
subject to both the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and the Oglala tribal 
government as a result of this classification.  He is subject to the tribal 
jurisdiction not because he is a member of that tribe, or lives in that area, or 
has contacts with the forum, but solely because he is a member of an Indian 
tribe by birth.3 
 
 *David P. Weber is an attorney in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  He would like to give special 
thanks to NMW, IMW, and GMW. 
 †Author’s note: Throughout this article the term “Indian” is used in reference to American 
Indians.  The term is used solely to avoid any undue confusion due to the fact that case law and 
legislation in this subject area utilize the term Indian exclusively when referring to American 
Indians. 
1. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
2. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128-39 (1959). 
3. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 193-94 (recognizing the “inherent power” of a tribe to prosecute 
nonmember Indians). 
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Part I of this article will briefly review the traditional constitutional 
role of Congress in negotiations with American Indian tribes, its plenary 
powers, and the treaty powers.  It will examine the Supreme Court’s early 
decisions regarding Indian tribes as well as its decision in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,4 U.S. v. Wheeler,5 and Duro v. Reina6 and the 
theories of sovereignty that the Supreme Court used in deciding those cases. 
Part II will look at the legislation that gave rise to the potentially prob-
lematic issues involving tribal jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. § 1301,7 and at the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Enas,8 as well as the competing 
decision United States v. Lara9 handed down by the Eighth Circuit.  It will 
address the decision by the Ninth Circuit and analyze the difficulties with 
its arguments as pointed out by district courts within that circuit.  Addition-
ally, this part will analyze the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301 and its premise that the decision in Duro was constitutional.  Part III 
will provide an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 7-2 decision in United 
States v. Lara,10 which reversed the Eighth Circuit.11  It will evaluate 
Justice Breyer’s majority decision and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lara, and point out potential issues in the premises employed in arriving at 
those decisions.  It will also examine Justice Thomas’s concurrence and 
evaluate whether or not the concurrence should have come out differently 
under his analysis.12  Finally, it will look at Justice Souter’s dissent and the 
Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision in Lara and argue that the Supreme Court 
incorrectly decided Lara.  Part IV will attempt to provide two possible, and 
substantially different solutions to the problem.  This article will conclude 
that the Supreme Court’s decision further clouded the issue of tribal 
sovereignty vis-à-vis congressional authority to act in Indian affairs, and it 
will provide a simple solution to the constitutional underpinnings present 
that the Court could have utilized in Lara. 
 
4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
5. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
6. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2007). 
8. 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001). 
9. 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003). 
10. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
11. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210. 
12. Id. at 1641-48. 
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I. TRADITIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS AND INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND EARLY JURISPRUDENCE 
REGARDING INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall 
have the authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.13  This 
clause has often been cited as the source of Congress’s plenary power to 
deal with the Indian nations.14  If Congress does indeed have plenary power 
to regulate the Indian tribes, then 25 U.S.C. § 1301 is a valid exercise of 
that power.  Interestingly, however, the Framers’ intent may not have been 
for Congress to act in this fashion.15  Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Con-
stitution provides that the President shall have the authority, by and with the 
consent of the Senate to enter into treaties.16  Further, the United States’ 
dealings with the Indian tribes were generally formalized through the treaty 
process until 1871.17 
The premise that Congress has plenary power to act with regard to the 
Indian tribes presents two troublesome issues.  First, why did the executive 
branch choose to act in a manner that, at least implicitly, conferred sover-
eign status on Indian tribes when they were defined separately from foreign 
nations in the Constitution?  Second, why did Congress then feel the need 
to, after having acquiesced in this approach and commissioned groups to 
negotiate treaty rights, pass a law explicitly affirming a supposed constitu-
tional right?18  Case law in this subject matter, as noted by Justice Thomas 
 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).  From the framing of the Constitution, the U.S. 
government had already decided to treat Indian tribes different than foreign nations, and thus not 
as traditional sovereigns. 
14. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 
655 (2006) (noting, however, that this “Indian Commerce Clause” is limited to the governance of 
commerce without more). 
15. See Vine Deloria, Jr., “Congress in its Wisdom”: The Course of Indian Legislation, in 
THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S, 106-08 (Sandra 
L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984).  Until about 1850, Congress had not even begun to 
assume a more active role.  Id. at 106.  Indeed, the U.S. government’s actions with the U.S. Indian 
tribes had largely been in the form of treaties.  Id. at 106-07. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
17. See Deloria, supra note 15, at 106-07. 
18. See 16 Stat. 544, 544 (1871).  Curiously, this bill declared that no tribe would thereafter 
be recognized as capable of making treaties with the United States, but that existing treaties would 
be honored.  Id. at 570.  The bill is superfluous if Indian nations are exclusively within the prov-
ince of congressional authority.  Deloria, supra note 15, at 107.  The fact that existing treaties 
would be honored may not have been even necessary, and was not completely accurate as over 
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in Lara,19 is full of conflicting logic as the courts found themselves forced 
to decide between competing theories of sovereignty espoused by the same 
government. 
One of the most famous statements of the era, and perhaps of all U.S. 
jurisprudence concerning Indian tribes, fittingly comes from Chief Justice 
John Marshall when he declared that the tribes are “domestic dependent 
nations.”20  Marshall’s decisions in the Cherokee Nation case as well as in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh21 and Worcester v. Georgia22 provided the foundation 
for all future jurisprudence regarding Indian sovereignty.23 
There are three basic principles that underlie these three temporary 
close yet contradictory cases: (1) Indian tribes possess certain elements of 
preexisting sovereignty due to their occupation of the land and self-
governance that predated the Constitution;24 (2) even though they possessed 
some type of sovereignty, it was subject to control and/or restrictions or 
elimination by the federal government, but not by the states;25 and, (3) the 
tribes’ limited inherent sovereignty and their “domestic dependent” status 
 
100 agreements with Indian tribes were made after the act, and “the congressional attitude was 
that treaties could be violated at whim because Congress in its wisdom would act in the best 
interest of Indians.”  Id. 
19. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice 
Thomas noted: 
[M]uch of the confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely 
incompatible and doubtful assumptions.  First, Congress (rather than some other part 
of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without 
rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity.  Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 47 (1831).  Essentially Marshall invented the 
“trust” relationship and said that the U.S. government is to protect the tribes from interference and 
intrusion from state governments and citizens.  Id.  It was in reply to this decision that President 
Jackson supposedly quipped: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!”  
DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 365 (1949). 
21. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  Marshall held that Indian tribes could not convey land to private 
parties without the consent of the federal government.  M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 603-05. 
22. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  This case essentially held that the state of Georgia had no authority 
over the Indian Territory located within its boundaries, and further that states cannot tax Indians 
residing in Indian Territory.  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-61. 
23. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 627; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16. 
24. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61 (1832) (concluding that a weaker power does not 
relinquish its sovereignty solely due to the fact that it has agreed to the protection of a more 
powerful nation). 
25. See id. at 561.  “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, 
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”  Id. 
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on the federal government imposed on the U.S. government a trust 
responsibility.26 
Especially interesting is that, although criminal jurisdiction remained 
with the Indian tribes for some time,27 the passage of the Major Crimes Act 
by Congress in 1885 removed all doubt as to the extent of the jurisdiction of 
the federal government on Indian reservations.28  Prior to the enactment of 
the Major Crimes Act, one case in particular propelled Congress to revisit 
its authority in the criminal arena in the Indian territories.29  In Ex Parte 
Crow Dog,30 federal agents sought to prosecute a Sioux Indian, Crow Dog, 
for the murder of another, even though he had already been found guilty in 
a tribal proceeding.31  The federal authorities pursued this federal prosecu-
tion even while believing that they lacked such authority.32  The Supreme 
Court granted Crow Dog’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground 
that extending jurisdiction “would be to reverse in this instance the general 
policy of the government toward the Indians, as declared in many statutes 
and treaties, and recognized in many decisions of this court, from the 
beginning to the present time.”33  In its conclusion, the court noted that to 
allow the granting of federal jurisdiction in the case would “require[] a clear 
expression of the intention of Congress, . . . [which] we have not been able 
to find.”34 
 
26. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11-12.  See generally AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
DESKBOOK (3d ed. 2004) (providing a comprehensive analysis of developments in the field of 
Indian law). 
27. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (holding that the ability of the 
tribe to deal with certain criminal offenses was an attribute of tribal sovereignty that had not been 
restricted by an act of Congress). 
28. See Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1135 (2000)). 
29. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559-60.  Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux band of the 
Sioux nation, murdered a fellow tribe member.  Id.  He was tried and found guilty in a customary 
tribal proceeding following the offense.  See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and 
Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 801 (2006). 
30. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
31. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.  See Washburn, supra note 29 at 801 (noting that Crow Dog 
and his family paid to the victim’s family $600 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket—an amount 
which would have represented “a small fortune at the time”). 
32. Id. at 800 (citing Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 202-03, 223 (1989)) (discussing how the federal 
authorities were determined to proceed with the prosecution, and the prosecution of other Indians, 
even without the authority to do so, until finally being admonished by the Secretary of Interior to 
adhere to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crow Dog). 
33. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
34. Id. 
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Congress did not delay its response, and enacted the Major Crimes Act 
soon thereafter.35  The Department of the Interior lobbied for new legisla-
tion to allow punishment for major crimes, claiming that tribal law and 
sanctions provided insufficient remedies.36  Congress agreed with the 
Department of Interior and passed the Major Crimes Act which acted as a 
swift and authoritative overruling of the holding in Ex Parte Crow Dog, and 
further demonstrated Congress’s absolute power and authority to restrict 
and regulate the Indian tribes.37 
Yet, even though many decisions had concluded that Congress had 
plenary power,38 the crux of the question the Supreme Court is still trying to 
solve today is whether tribes have inherent powers of sovereignty that 
predate the Constitution, or whether they only have those attributes of 
sovereignty that Congress has delegated to them.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURT’S ANSWER TO SOVEREIGNTY IN 
LATER CASES—OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE AND 
UNITED STATES  V. WHEELER 
Two of the most important cases regarding the constitutional and 
sovereign status of Indian tribes were decided within three weeks of each 
other in 1978.39  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe40 decided the issue of 
whether or not Indians had territorial jurisdiction over crimes on 
reservations, whereas United States v. Wheeler41 decided the issue of 
whether or not tribal jurisdiction was a delegation of power from the federal 
 
35. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2000)). 
36. Id.; see also Washburn, supra note 29, at 803  (noting that the Secretary of the Interior, in 
a report to Congress in 1884, falsely portrayed Indian Country as a “lawless place” where the 
inhabitants were “the next of kin was duty-bound to avenge murder”).  The Secretary also argued 
that, lacking any intervention by Congress to extend jurisdiction, no court system would have the 
authority to hear any similar case.  Id. at 803.  A claim which was patently false as Crow Dog had 
been tried and convicted by in a tribal proceeding.  Id. 
37. Washburn, supra note 29, at 803-04.  Coming shortly after the decision in Crow Dog, 
Congress filled any potential vacuum regarding the tribes’ authority to provide criminal 
punishment for specific offenses.  Id.; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) 
(“The plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a ‘guardian-
ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”).  See generally Gloria 
Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 333, 344 (2004). 
38. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that Congress has “plenary 
and exclusive” authority to legislate in Indian affairs); Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-52; United States 
v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006). 
39. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978) (noting that the case was 
decided on March 6, 1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 313 (1978) (noting that the 
case was decided on March 22, 1978). 
40. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
41. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
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government.42  Though both cases were decided by the same members of 
the Court within a three-week period, the cases present striking differences. 
1. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court in Oliphant, 
delved deeply into the historical circumstances of the Port Madison 
reservation on which the Suquamish Indian Tribe resides.43  The Court 
noted that the Tribe had placed notices at the entrances to the reservation 
that stated that entry onto the Reservation by any person would be deemed 
implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the Suquamish Tribal 
Court.44  In this case, two non-Indians were arrested on the Port Madison 
reservation, and arraigned before the tribal court.45 
The Tribe argued that its jurisdiction flowed from the “Tribe’s retained 
inherent powers of government over the Port Madison Indian Reserva-
tion.”46  The Ninth Circuit decided this case in favor of the Tribe, and stated 
that criminal jurisdiction occasioned by offenses committed on the reserva-
tion, other than those that are assumed by the federal government, is a sine 
qua non of its powers.47  The Supreme Court reversed and held that an 
Indian tribe may not assume criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without 
the express permission of Congress.48 
 
42. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332. 
43. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 192-93.  It is important to note that this case involves the 
distinction solely between non-Indians and Indians and the language of the case so follows.  This 
case was decided when the majority of the Indian reservation was owned by non-Indians (sixty-
three percent) and the two groups were in constant contact. DAVID EUGENE WILKINS, AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 187 (1997). 
44. Id. at 193-94 n.2.  The idea of territorial/personal jurisdiction which the tribe tried to 
extend has been the basis of criminal jurisdiction in the United States from its inception, and is the 
most common way that jurisdiction is obtained.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) 
(holding that physical presence in the forum, for however brief a time, is sufficient to grant that 
forum jurisdiction over the individual). 
45. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.  Mark David Oliphant was charged with assaulting a tribal 
officer and resisting arrest.  Id.  Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested after an alleged high-speed race 
along reservation highways that ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal police vehicle.  Id.  
Belgarde was charged with “recklessly endangering another person.”  Id. 
46. Id. at 196. 
47. Id.; Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012-14 (1976).  Indeed, at the time of this case, 
thirty-three of the 127 reservation court systems claimed to extend their jurisdiction over non-
Indians, and twelve others had ordinances which would permit the assumption of such jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196. 
48. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.  In footnote 8, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the tribes 
were indeed granted jurisdiction over non-Indians in some treaties in the case of non-Indians 
entering Indian land without the consent of the federal government.  Id. at 197-98 n.8.  Justice 
Rehnquist concludes, however, that “[f]ar from representing a recognition of any inherent Indian 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . these provisions were instead intended as a means of 
discouraging non-Indian settlements on Indian territory . . . .”  Id. at 198 n.8.  Thus, even when the 
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The Oliphant Court examined the history of the issue, and stated that, 
beginning with the passage of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, 
Congress assumed federal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against 
Indians.49  The Court also examined the Major Crimes Act of 1885, and 
stated that it was enacted to place Indian offenders under the jurisdiction of 
federal courts when certain major offenses are committed.50  The Court 
explained that one of its primary worries in the Oliphant case was that, “[i]f 
tribal courts may try non-Indians, . . . those tribal courts are free to try non-
Indians even for such major offenses as Congress may well have given the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members of their own tribe 
committing the exact same offenses.”51 
The Court correctly noted that Congress cannot have intended to give 
Indian tribes jurisdiction for violent crimes over non-Indians when they 
clearly lack that jurisdiction over their own members.52  The Court then 
stated that the Suquamish, in their treaty with the United States, “in all 
probability recogniz[ed] that the United States would arrest and try non-
Indian intruders” on their reservation.53  The Court read the treaty provision 
in conjunction with the law that extended federal enclave law to non-Indian 
offenses and stated that this “implies” that the Suquamish are to promptly 
turn over any non-Indian offenders to the United States.54  In drafting the 
treaty, Commissioners of the Bureau of Indian Affairs rejected treaty lan-
guage that specified that the United States would retain criminal jurisdiction 
in favor of language that did not address the issue.55  The Court stated that 
“it seems probable” that the Commissioners simply preferred such lan-
guage, and that it “could well have been understood” as acknowledging that 
the federal government had exclusive criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.56 
 
Court was faced with evidence of expressly granted jurisdiction, the Court held that no such 
jurisdiction existed.  Id. at 198-99 n.8. 
49. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 138 (1790).  In 1817, Congress extended 
federal enclave law to Indian territory.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201. 
50. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)). 
51. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203. 
52. Id.  (emphasis added). 
53. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at 207 n.16. 
56. Id.  (emphasis added).  The Court proffers this analysis and then notes ironically in a 
footnote that: 
In interpreting Indian treaties and statutes, “[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved 
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, 
dependent upon its protection and good faith.”  But treaty and statutory provisions 
which are not clear on their face may “be clear from the surrounding circumstances 
and legislative history.” 
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Regardless of any ambiguity, the Court held that absent affirmative 
delegation of such by power by Congress, Indians do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.  The Court concluded, as all history and 
precedent dictated, that “[w]hile Congress never expressly forbade Indian 
tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express 
our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently 
believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”57 
Though the holding in Oliphant did not raise many eyebrows, the Court 
provided a valuable insight when it adopted the Ninth Circuit’s summation 
of the state of Indian sovereignty:58  “Indian tribes are prohibited from 
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly 
terminated by Congress and those powers “inconsistent with their status.”59  
This last clause came to have constitutional importance in the Duro case.60 
2. United States v. Wheeler 
Wheeler decided the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment’s double 
jeopardy clause barred the prosecution of an Indian in federal court under 
the Major Crimes Act when he had previously been convicted in a tribal 
court of a lesser included offense arising out of the same conduct.61  Thus, 
the essential question in Wheeler was whether tribal courts receive their 
authority from the federal government.  If they do, the subsequent prosecu-
tion would be barred by the double jeopardy clause as a second prosecution 
by the same sovereign.62  If not, case law is clear that the theory of dual 
sovereignty provides that a federal prosecution does not bar a future 
prosecution by a separate sovereign (usually a state) for the same acts.63 
 
Id. at 208 n.17 (internal citations omitted).  The Court concluded that the surrounding 
circumstances and legislative history were dispositive. 
57. Id. at 204. 
58. Id. at 208. 
59. Id. at 221 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)). 
60. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1989). 
61. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 314 (1978).  The defendant Indian was arrested 
and convicted of disorderly conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  Id. at 314-15.  
He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen days in jail or a fine of $30 on the first charge and to 
sixty days in jail or a fine of $120 on the second.  Id. at 315.  A year later the federal government 
charged the defendant with statutory rape with a possible penalty of fifteen years imprisonment.  
Id. at 315 n.3. 
62. Id. at 318-19. 
63. Id. at 318-20.  See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959).  The logic 
underlying this assumption is that an offense is a violation of a law.  Separate sovereigns may 
each classify a certain act as an offense under their law.  Therefore, one act results in two distinct 
offenses.  However, in a relationship such as a city-state or territory-federal government, the city 
and territory are both acting as agents of the sovereign and therefore a prosecution in one, bars a 
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The Ninth Circuit held that the concept of dual sovereignty should not 
apply to this case because “Indian tribes are not themselves sovereigns, but 
derive their power to punish crimes from the Federal Government.”64  The 
Court reversed and stated that the dispositive issue was the “ultimate source 
of the power under which the respective prosecutions were undertaken.”65  
The Court framed the issue as to whether the ability to punish tribal 
offenders was an inherent part of tribal sovereignty or whether Congress 
had delegated this power to the tribes.66 
Though Indian tribes no longer possess the full attributes of sover-
eignty, the Court noted that their powers are “inherent powers . . . which 
ha[ve] never been extinguished.”67  Whatever sovereignty remains, it is of a 
“unique and limited character.  It exists only at the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance.”68  The Navajo Tribe never gave up 
the authority to punish tribal offenders, and subsequent federal statutes have 
recognized that Indian tribes have jurisdiction over their own members.69  
Finally, the Court noted that the power of a tribe to prosecute its own mem-
bers was not part of the sovereignty lost implicitly when Indians gave up 
their independent status.70  The Court, therefore, stated that it is “undis-
puted” that Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their own members 
and that, “[t]heir right of internal self-government includes the right to 
prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce those laws by 
criminal sanctions.”71 
In answering the question presented by Wheeler, the Court held that 
any power which had not been expressly restricted by the federal 
 
further prosecution by the same sovereign.  See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), Ltd., 302 
U.S. 253, 264-68 (1937). 
64. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 319. 
65. Id. at 320.  The Court extensively analyzed the analogies drawn between cities and states 
as well as those between the federal government and territories.  Id. at 320-22.  The Court 
concluded that both cities and states act as the agent of their respective sovereign and their power 
is derived exclusively from those sovereigns.  Id. at 321-22. 
66. Id. at 322. 
67. Id. at 323 (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
68. Id. at 323.  (emphasis added).  The Court also noted that until Congress acts, expressly or 
by implication, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.  Id. 
69. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324; see Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 138; Act of 
Mar. 3, 1817, § 2, 3 Stat. 383. 
70. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.  It is interesting to note that the Court, three weeks after its 
decision in Oliphant described its holding as saying that Indian tribes “cannot try nonmembers in 
tribal courts.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
71. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).  It is important to take notice, though future cases make the 
argument that this is not so, that the Court decided this case as the right of the tribe to regulate its 
own members.  Id.  The entire opinion consistently distinguished only the ability of a tribe to 
regulate its members versus any authority to regulate all other third parties.  Id. 
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government arose solely from the tribes’ inherent sovereignty, and was not 
a delegation of power from the federal government.72  Thus, Wheeler con-
cluded that the Tribes had sovereign authority for some criminal prosecu-
tions.  “The power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by Tribe 
members . . . has never been taken away . . . .”73 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted, “we do not mean to 
imply that a tribe which was deprived of [a sovereign power] by statute or 
treaty and then regained it by Act of Congress would necessarily be an arm 
of the Federal Government.  That interesting question is not before us, and 
we express no opinion thereon.”74  That question would be partly resolved 
twelve years later in Duro v. Reina.75 
C. DURO V. REINA—THE LIMITS OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the interesting question that 
Justice Stewart declined to address in Wheeler.76  The defendant, a member 
of a different tribe, was charged with the illegal firing of a weapon on the 
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Reservation.77  From the outset of the 
decision, the Court held that “retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political 
and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the 
authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own 
membership.”78 
In analyzing the issue of whether tribes have criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, the Court noted that several issues had been raised in the 
courts below, most importantly, the violation of equal protection based on 
racial classification.79  The district court initially held that the assertion of 
tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember would violate the equal protection 
 
72. Id. at 328.  In reaching this conclusion, and allowing subsequent prosecution of the 
defendant by the tribal court, the Court delineated powers that were implicitly lost when Indian 
tribes became dependents of the United States.  Id. at 326.  Most important to this article, one of 
the powers that was lost was the freedom to determine external relations; a Tribe is only allowed 
to govern the relations among members of the tribe.  Id. 
73. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). 
74. Id. at 328 n.28.  This issue is essentially the one that the Court faced in Duro as well as in 
the title case of this article. 
75. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
76. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685-86. 
77. Id. at 679-81.  The defendant was initially charged with murder and aiding and abetting 
murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, but the federal indictment was later dismissed by the 
United States Attorney.  Id. 
78. Id. at 679. 
79. Id. at 683; see Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1143-45 (1987). 
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guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.80  The court of appeals 
rejected this argument when it found “no racial classification in subjecting 
petitioner to tribal jurisdiction that could not be asserted over a non-
Indian.”81  The Supreme Court reversed the decision.82 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, framed the question as 
“whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes in their dependent status 
within our scheme of government includes the power of criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.”83  The Court stated that the rationale in 
Oliphant and Wheeler, as well as subsequent case law, compelled the 
conclusion that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.84  
The Court found the language in Wheeler that differentiated between mem-
ber and nonmember to be controlling.85  Further, it concluded that a basic 
attribute of sovereignty is the right to regulate those who enter the 
sovereign’s territory.86 
Oliphant recognized that the tribes are not sovereigns in regard to 
territorial jurisdiction, and Wheeler held that the retained sovereignty of the 
tribes is “that needed to control their own internal relations and to preserve 
their own unique customs and social order.”87  The Court noted, “[t]he 
areas in which . . .  implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have 
 
80. Duro, 495 U.S. at 683; see 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2007).  The district court looked at the 
situation and held that subjecting a nonmember Indian to tribal jurisdiction would constitute 
discrimination based on race.  Duro, 851 F.2d at 1144-45.  The court noted that both non-Indians 
and nonmembers have neither the right to participate in the tribal government, nor a lesser fear of 
discrimination in a court system that bars the participation of their peers.  Id. at 1145. 
81. Duro, 495 U.S. at 683.  Interestingly, the court of appeals rested this conclusion on the 
fact that the defendant had significant contacts with the Pima-Maricopa community.  Duro, 851 
F.2d at 1144.  Such contacts included residing with a tribal member and working for a tribal 
company.  Id.  However, it appears that a contacts-based test such as the one utilized by the Ninth 
Circuit would not have been considered sufficient to grant the Tribe jurisdiction over a non-
Indian. 
82. Duro, 495 U.S. at 698. 
83. Id. at 684. 
84. Id. at 684-85. 
Our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler provide the analytic framework for resolution 
of this dispute.  Oliphant established that the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes 
does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the 
reservation.  Wheeler reaffirmed the longstanding recognition of tribal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by tribe members.  The case before us is at the intersection of 
these two precedents, for here the defendant is an Indian, but not a member of the 
Tribe that asserts jurisdiction. 
Id. at 684. 
85. Id. at 685-86. 
86. Id. at 685. 
87. Id. at 685-86.  The Court went on to note that the “power of a tribe to prescribe and 
enforce rules of conduct for its own members ‘does not fall within that part of sovereignty which 
the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status.’”  Id. at 686 (quoting United States 
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
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occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe.”88  Further, the dependent status of Indian tribes is 
inconsistent with any attempt to independently determine their external 
relations. 
In resolving the issue at hand, the Court recognized that the defendant’s 
relationship to this Tribe was similar to the non-Indian’s relation in 
Oliphant, and as such, it was subject to the same limitations.89  The Court 
correctly noted that evidence preventing criminal jurisdiction over non-
members was not overwhelming, but opinions by the solicitors of the 
Department of the Interior, as well as past case law, favor the holding that 
tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over members only.90  On the issue 
of equal protection guarantees, the Court was reluctant to “single out 
another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies 
that do not include them . . . [and] no delegation of authority to a tribe has 
to date included the power to punish nonmembers in tribal court.”91 
The Duro Court concluded that the logic and precedent that prevented 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, who share the same characteristic as non-
members, required a holding that tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers as well.92  In its summation, the Court held that it could 
not accept the arguments in favor of “finding tribal jurisdiction that is 
inconsistent with precedent, history, and the equal treatment of Native 
American citizens.”93  That concluding statement would have been suffi-
cient to decide future cases on the same matter had Congress not attempted 
to intervene and legislatively overrule Duro. 
 
88. Id. at 686 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) (emphasis added). 
89. See id. at 695 (“[T]ribes are not mere fungible groups of homogenous persons among 
whom any Indian would feel at home.”). 
90. See 1 Op. Sol. 699 (1936) (“Inherent rights of self government may be invoked to justify 
punishment of members of the tribe but not of non members.”); 1 Op. Sol. 849 (1938) (mentioning 
only adoption of nonmembers into the tribe or receipt of delegated authority as means of acquiring 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).  See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-27. 
91. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94 (emphasis added). 
92. Id. at 696.  The Ninth Circuit and Justice Brennan, in dissent, made the argument that 
prohibiting jurisdiction in this case would create a jurisdictional void because no sovereign would 
have the power to try the defendant for the crime charged.  See Duro, 495 U.S. at 704-06 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145-46 (1987).  That argument is 
somewhat disingenuous because the federal government did initially charge the defendant with 
murder and with aiding and abetting murder, crimes encompassed by the Major Crimes Act, and 
Arizona only lacked authority because it had specifically disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian 
Country Crimes.  Id. at 696-98. 
93. Duro, 495 U.S. at 698. 
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II. UNITED STATES V. ENAS AND UNITED STATES V. LARA—
DELEGATION VERSUS RELAXATION AND WHY THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT 
Enas and Lara deal with the same factual situation.  A nonmember 
Indian is tried for a criminal offense by the tribe, and then subsequently 
tried by the federal government.  This type of prosecution, which was 
prohibited in Duro, received new life shortly thereafter.  In 1990, Congress 
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).94  Previously, the ICRA 
defined tribal “powers of self-government” as “all governmental powers 
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all 
offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, 
including courts of Indian offenses.”95  The 1990 amendments changed the 
definition to include [the] means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”96 
Essentially, Congress legislatively attempted to rewrite the history of 
Indian sovereignty that the Supreme Court had recently penned, and, 
surprisingly to some, it succeeded. 
A. UNITED STATES V. ENAS—THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF 
AMENDED § 1301(2) 
In Enas, the defendant, a member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, was 
charged, convicted, and sentenced for assault with a deadly weapon and 
assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury in the tribal court of the 
White Mountain Apache Tribe.97  The defendant was then indicted in 
federal district court.98  The district court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that it was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.99  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard this case to identify the “ultimate 
source of the power under which the respective prosecution[] [was] 
undertaken.”100 
The Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Duro, and summarized the Supreme Court’s conclusion as being “that the 
 
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (providing the definition of “powers of self-
government”). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (emphasis added). 
97. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2001). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 666 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)). 
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tribes’ inherent authority never included [the power to prosecute non-
members.]”101  The Ninth Circuit also added an aside from the American 
Indian Law Review: “Everyone assumes Congress could have created new 
law by delegating federal power to tribes to try nonmember Indians. . . . 
[But,] if the delegatee has no power in a particular area, the delegatee 
exercises the power of the person doing the delegation.”102  Though these 
two arguments appear straightforward, the Ninth Circuit framed the 
question at hand as to whether Congress had the authority to rewrite 
history.103  Congress was sure to make clear in the legislative history of the 
ICRA amendments that these “amendments were not a congressional 
delegation of authority, but rather a recognition of power that always 
existed.”104 
The Ninth Circuit had previously examined this issue in Means v. 
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.105  In Means, the court stated that 
Congress was without the authority to rewrite history in this fashion— 
Congress, intended the 1990 amendments “to ‘legislatively overrule’ the 
Supreme Court’s decision.”106  But, Congress could not do so: 
While the legislative history of [the 1990 amendments] suggests 
that Congress did not intend to delegate . . . to the tribes [the 
authority to prosecute nonmember Indians], that is essentially the 
amendments’ effect.  While Congress is always free to amend laws 
it believes the Supreme Court has misinterpreted, it cannot 
somehow erase the fact that the Court did interpret the prior law.  
In other words, once the Supreme Court has ruled that the law is 
“X,” Congress can come back and say, “no, the law is ‘Y,’” but it 
cannot say that the law was never “X” or always “Y.” . . . Thus, 
regardless of Congress’ intent to declare that tribes always had the 
 
101. Id. at 668. 
102. Id. at 667 (quoting Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. 
Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 112 (1992)). 
103. Enas, 255 F.3d at 670; see also United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F 3d 818, 823 (8th 
Cir. 1998).  “[W]e are presented with a legislative enactment purporting to recast history in a 
manner that alters the Supreme Court’s stated understanding of the organizing principles by which 
the Indian tribes were incorporated into our constitutional system of government.”  Id. 
104. Enas, 255 F.3d at 669.  See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H2988-02 (daily ed. May 14, 1991) 
(statement of Rep. Miller) (“This bill recognizes an inherent tribal right which always existed.  It 
is not a delegation of authority but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly taken 
away.)  It is plain that Congress wanted to make clear that the tribes had jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.  Id.  However, Congress also wanted to allow separate prosecutions of the same 
persons for the same acts, and it knew it could not do so if that authority was a delegation of 
power to the tribes from itself.  Id. 
105. 154 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
106. Means, 154 F.3d at 946. 
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inherent authority to try nonmember Indians, that simply cannot be 
what the amendments accomplished.107 
With these arguments in hand, it appeared that the Ninth Circuit would 
adopt the logical premises of Means and Duro and rule that the Indian tribes 
did not have inherent sovereignty over nonmembers, and therefore the new 
power was a delegation of congressional authority.  That did not happen.108 
The Ninth Circuit stated that Duro was based on federal common 
law,109 and did not rest on any constitutional principles.110  As such, the 
court of appeals held that Congress is the final arbiter of federal common 
law, and Congress’s power in that realm is supreme.111  Though the Ninth 
Circuit permitted Congress’s revised history, it did not place much credence 
in its own arguments.112  Additionally, Means is overruled only in a foot-
note, and only partially.113  Therefore the Ninth Circuit rejected the hold-
ings of Duro and Means, but noted, “[w]ere this an issue of constitutional 
history, the outcome would be different.”114  As the Enas court was 
unwilling to go that far, Congress’s new and reinterpreted history of Indian 
sovereignty became the law of the land in the Ninth Circuit. 
 
107. Id. 
108. See generally Enas, 255 F.3d at 675. 
109. Federal common law is court made law that is neither constitutional nor statutory.  See 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 349 (3d ed., 1999). 
110. Enas, 255 F.3d at 674. 
It would be disingenuous to suggest that this question presents a simple answer.  On 
the contrary, “history” falls outside of the usual litany of authorities controlled by 
designated branches of government.  It is neither “constitution” nor “statute,” and can 
only roughly be labeled “federal common law.”  This rough fit is, however, the best 
one. 
Id. 
111. Id. at 675. 
112. See id. at 675.  The Ninth Circuit devoted less than one page of its analysis to the issue 
of federal common law and Congressional authority.  The entire discussion of federal common 
law and the role of Congress is confined to a single paragraph that ultimately decides the case.  
The issue that arose in Duro and Means, whether equal protection guarantees are violated when a 
nonmember is subjected to tribal jurisdiction, was not raised.  Id. at 675 n.8.  In its final footnote 
the Ninth Circuit makes clear that this issue was not raised in the present case, and the outcome 
might have been different if it had.  Id. 
113. Id. (overruling Means only to the extent that it held that Congress did not have the 
authority to reinterpret federal common law). 
114. Id. at 675 (noting that Congress does not have the authority to “override a constitutional 
decision by simply rewriting the history upon which it is based”). 
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B. UNITED STATES V. LARA—THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S RULING THAT 
HISTORY CANNOT BE REWRITTEN 
Following the decision in Enas, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
examined a nearly identical set of facts and yielded a different outcome.115  
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the holdings of Oliphant, Wheeler, Duro, and 
Montana v. United States116 and quickly framed the issue similar to the 
Ninth Circuit, as to whether the tribal court “exercised sovereign authority 
emanating from a sovereign source distinct from that of the overriding 
federal sovereign.”117  The Eighth Circuit also noted that in response to 
Duro, Congress had amended the ICRA to its current broad definition.118  
Whereas the Ninth Circuit permitted Congress to rewrite history to suit its 
legislative needs, the Eighth Circuit did not.  The Eighth Circuit held that 
Duro was a constitutional decision: 
With all due respect to the holding in Enas, we conclude that the 
distinction between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of 
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately 
entrusted to the Supreme Court.  Absent a delegation from Con-
gress, a tribe’s powers are those “inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”  Once the federal 
sovereign divests a tribe of a particular power, it is no longer an 
inherent power and it may only be restored by delegation of 
Congress’s power.119 
The Eighth Circuit noted that Congress’s power over Indian affairs is 
derived from and limited by the Constitution.120  Then, the Eighth Circuit 
did what the Ninth Circuit had decided against, and declared that Duro’s 
 
115. See United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).  The 
defendant struck a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer while being arrested on the Spirit Lake Nation 
Reservation of which he was not a member.  Id. at 636.  He plead guilty to tribal code violations 
that included violence to a policeman.  Id.  The defendant was also indicted for assault on a 
federal officer and argued against that indictment on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. 
116. In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court again emphasized the distinction be-
tween the sovereignty of a tribe over members versus nonmembers, and that all tribal sovereignty 
over external relations, i.e., nonmembers, had been necessarily divested from the tribes.  450 U.S. 
544, 563-64 (1981) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). 
117. Montana, 450 U.S. at 637. 
118. Id. at 638.  The Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, after the ICRA amend-
ments, had “repeatedly reaffirmed its holding limiting tribal sovereign authority to tribe 
members.”  Id.; see, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649 (2001) (reject-
ing the imposition of a hotel occupancy tax on a nonmember owned hotel within the reservation 
owned in fee by nonmembers); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (citing Oliphant for 
the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of a tribe do not extend beyond 
regulation of their members). 
119. Lara, 324 F.3d at 639 (internal citations omitted). 
120. Id. 
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decision regarding Indian sovereignty in the U.S. federal system of 
government was a decision for the courts, and that after Montana, “tribal 
sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive without express congres-
sional delegation,’ and is therefore not inherent.”121 
The Eighth Circuit echoed the argument first put forth in Means and 
detailed fully in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Enas, that Congress cannot 
retroactively legislate a reversal of Duro.  The Eighth Circuit did not de-
clare the ICRA amendments to be null, but correctly noted that Congress 
has plenary powers in this field, and that “[i]t is apparent that Congress 
wished to allow tribes to exercise criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians.”122  However, the Eighth Circuit was not willing to 
concede this grant of power without cost, as the Ninth Circuit had.  The 
Eighth Circuit declared that the Tribe exercised only that authority that had 
“been delegated to it by Congress.”123  Therefore, the subsequent federal 
prosecution of the defendant was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.124 
The decision by the Eighth Circuit in Lara reached what logically 
appears to be the correct result, but the lack of support for its argument that 
Duro is a constitutional decision is troublesome.  Perhaps the principal 
reason that the Supreme Court in Lara adopted the result in Enas, was this 
lack of constitutional foundation.  This lack of constitutional support exists 
partly because the results in Duro and subsequent case law were clear on 
the issue that the power of tribes over nonmembers was not inherent and did 
not exist neither did it provide a greater depth of analysis. 
III. UNITED STATES V. LARA—ALLOWING A RELAXATION OF A 
PRIOR RESTRICTION OVER TRIBAL AUTHORITY 
A. MAJORITY OPINION BY JUSTICE BREYER 
Justice Breyer framed the question as “whether Congress ha[d] the 
constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political branches 
ha[d] . . . placed on the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.”125  
 
121. Id. at 640 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Id.  As a result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lara, the equal protection violation 
did not need to be argued.  Under this result, the current racial classification that would be 
presented and allowed in the hypothetical situation presented in the Introduction to this article 
would be prohibited without more. 
125. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).  This question could likewise be 
framed as follows without losing any significance in its practical application: Does Congress have 
the constitutional authority to re-grant powers to Tribes that have previously been eliminated or 
restricted by the federal government?  The rephrased question is essentially the same in terms of 
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The Court referenced to Wheeler and Duro and then focused on the fact that 
Congress amended the ICRA shortly after Duro was decided.126  The Court 
believed the amendment to the ICRA did “not purport to delegate the 
Federal Government’s own federal power.  Rather, [the amendment] en-
larges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’ to include ‘the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.”127 
The Court, similar to the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, framed the ques-
tion as whether the source of the tribes’ power to punish nonmember 
Indians was inherent federal sovereignty or delegated federal authority.128  
The Court then noted that Congress probably intended for the latter.129  The 
language of both the amended version of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) and its 
legislative history leave no doubt that Congress intended the tribe to have 
inherent tribal power over nonmember Indians.130 
The Court put forth six arguments as to why the Constitution permits 
Congress to lift the restriction on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians.  Thus, the Court is able to bypass the question of whether 
the source of tribal power in criminal matters is sovereign or delegated.  
The Court’s arguments, in order, are the following: (1) the Constitution 
grants plenary powers to Congress to legislate in respect to Indian tribes;131 
(2) Congress has, with the Supreme Court’s approval, interpreted the Con-
stitution’s “plenary” grant of power over Indian affairs as enabling it to en-
act legislation that restricts and relaxes restrictions on tribal sovereignty;132 
(3) “Congress’ statutory goal—to modify the degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by a dependent sovereign that is not a State—is not an unusual legislative 
 
practical application, yet opposite to what Justice Breyer posited.  This difference in construction 
is ultimately the dispositive issue in the case. 
126. Id. at 197-98. 
127. Id. at 198 (emphasis in original). 
128. Id. at 199. 
129. Id.  Obviously both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are in complete agreement.  Were it 
otherwise there would have been absolutely no discussion of Congress’s attempt to rewrite history 
through a legislative act. 
130. See supra note 104; 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).  The statute’s legislative history is a 
record of Senators and Representatives providing their intentions with the Act, stating that the 
“premise [of the legislation] is that the Congress affirms the inherent jurisdiction of tribal 
governments.” 137 CONG. REC. S. 5223 (1991) (statement of Sen. Inouye) (emphasis added). The 
“statute is not a delegation of authority but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly 
taken away.”  137 CONG. REC. at 10712-714 (statement of Rep. Miller, House manager of bill). 
131. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203. 
132. Id. at 202; see Government-to-Government Relations With Native American Tribal 
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,951 (May 4, 1994).  Congressional policy has ranged from 
favoring Indian removal, to assimilation, to the breaking-up of tribal lands, to the protection of the 
tribal land base.  F. COHEN HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-202 (1982) (detailing the 
progress of federal policy with native American tribal governments). 
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objective;”133 (4) there is “no explicit language in the Constitution sug-
gesting a limitation on Congress’ institutional authority to relax restrictions 
on tribal sovereignty previously imposed by the political branches;”134 (5) 
the change at issue is a limited one;135 and, (6) the conclusion that Congress 
has the power to relax previously imposed restrictions is consistent with 
prior case law.136 
Justice Breyer, writing for the 7-2 majority noted: 
True, the Court held in . . . [Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro] that the 
power to prosecute nonmembers was an aspect of the tribes’ 
external relations and hence part of the tribal sovereignty that was 
divested by treaties and by Congress.  But these holdings reflect 
the Court’s view of the tribes’ retained sovereign status as of the 
time the Court made them.  They did not set forth constitutional 
limits that prohibit Congress from changing the relevant legal 
circumstances, i.e., from taking actions that modify or adjust the 
tribes’ status.137 
The Lara Court specifically noted that the Duro Court drew upon a variety 
of different sources in arriving at its holding.138  The Lara Court “referred 
to historic practices, the views of experts, the experience of forerunners of 
modern tribal courts, and the published opinions of the Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior.”139  The Court stated, however, that the deci-
sions in Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro were based on the inherent tribal 
authority as it existed at the time the Court made its decision, and that such 
authority was subject to change.140 
The Court then stated that prior cases “simply did not consider whether 
a statute, like the present one, could constitutionally achieve the same end 
by removing restrictions on the tribes’ inherent authority.”141  In this man-
ner, the Court avoided the question of whether or not a “relaxation of a 
restriction” previously imposed upon a sovereign power is equivalent to a 
 
133. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203. 
134. Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
135. Id.  The Court noted that this change largely concerns a tribe’s authority to control 
events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.  Id.  However, this is precisely what the Court and 
Congress have disavowed with regard to non-Indians and nonmembers.  Lara, therefore, effec-
tively allows race-based territorial jurisdiction. 
136. Id. at 205. 
137. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
138. Id. at 206. 
139. Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 689-92 (1990)). 
140. Id. at 206-07. 
141. Id. at 207. 
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new “delegation” to exercise that power.142  The Court held that Wheeler, 
Oliphant, and Duro were not determinative because the amendment to the 
ICRA relaxed restrictions which changed the calculus of what inherent 
sovereignty tribes possessed.143  “And that fact makes all the difference.”144 
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE LIMITED TO THE FACTS AT 
HAND 
The crux of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was that “Congress was 
careful to rely on the theory of inherent sovereignty, and not on a delega-
tion.  [The dissent’s] position that it was a delegation nonetheless, . . . is by 
no means without support, but I would take Congress at its word. . . .  That 
is all we need say to resolve this case.”145  However, Justice Kennedy went 
on to note that “[i]t is a most troubling proposition to say that Congress can 
relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in a way that extends 
that sovereignty beyond those historical limits.”146  Essentially, Congress 
did that with the 2000 revision to the ICRA. 
Again, Justice Kennedy noted the language being employed in the 
Court’s opinion, and stated that “[t]he Court resolves, or perhaps avoids, 
the basic question of the power of the Government to yield authority inside 
the domestic borders . . . by using the euphemistic formulation that in 
amending the ICRA Congress merely relaxed restrictions on the tribes.”147  
For all intents and purposes, thus far Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reads 
much more like a dissenting opinion.148  Justice Kennedy concluded that if 
the defendant truly wanted to challenge Congress’s actions in this case, the 
 
142. Id.  The Court, in passing on the question, noted that “we do not read any of the . . . 
[specific cases referring to the need to obtain a congressional statute that “delegated” power to the 
tribes] as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian 
law through this kind of legislation.”  Id.  By construing the amendment as a “change” rather than 
specifically a delegation of new authority or a relaxation of a prior restraint, the Court is able to 
proceed without more. 
143. Id. 
144. Id.  Unlike Enas, the defendant in Lara did raise the equal protection claim.  Id. at 209.  
However, the Court stated that such a claim is irrelevant to the double jeopardy claim at hand, and 
refused to address it.  Id. 
145. Id. at 211.  It is perhaps somewhat surprising that Justice Kennedy would be the one to 
make this statement as he was the author of the opinion that caused Congress to further amend the 
ICRA.  See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). 
146. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212. 
147. Id. at 213 (emphasis added). 
148. Id. at 211.  Justice Kennedy notes “[t]he Court’s holding is on a point of major signifi-
cance to our understanding and interpretation of the Constitution; and, in my respectful view, it is 
most doubtful.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy also stated that he is clearly aware of what Congress was 
attempting and noted “it should not be doubted that what Congress has attempted to do is subject 
American citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they had not 
previously been subject.”  Id. at 213. 
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proper place would have been in tribal court.149  By the time the second 
proceeding was brought by the federal government, “whether legitimate or 
not,” the rationale behind the tribal court’s actions was inherent sover-
eignty, and therefore there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.150 
Justice Kennedy provided some insight of what may come if a similar 
case were to be challenged at an earlier stage.  An uncomfortable Justice 
Kennedy noted that the decision of the Court rests upon the phrasing of 
Congress’s grant of power, and he noted that the Court is “trying to evade 
the important structural question by relying on the verbal formula of relax-
ation.”151  Though Justice Kennedy formally concurred in Lara, his opinion 
and analysis suggest that future challengers to the ICRA amendments may 
reach a different outcome. 
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Thomas wrote separately to specifically comment on the 
Court’s “inadequate constitutional analysis.”152  Justice Thomas did not 
agree that Congress had the authority to revise the limits on Indian sover-
eignty whenever it saw fit.153  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas noted a 
problem in Supreme Court case law that has been stated often and never 
resolved, “[i]n my view, the tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, 
and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both positions simul-
taneously.”154 
Justice Thomas took a strong position on the Court’s theory of Indian 
sovereignty, and stated that a sovereign is an entity “in which independent 
and supreme authority is vested.”155  He further noted that such a statement 
is logically at complete odds with Congress’s plenary powers over the 
tribes.156  However, as those are exactly the two positions espoused by the 
United States, “this confusion continues to infuse federal Indian law and 
 
149. Id. at 214.  “The proper occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe’s authority, that is, 
whether Congress had the power to do what it sought to do, was in the first, tribal proceeding.”  
Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 213. 
152. Id. at 215. 
153. Id.  Justice Thomas noted that there are two largely incompatible assumptions at play in 
all of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the Indians tribes, resulting in many poorly written 
opinions: (1) “Congress . . . can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering 
tribal sovereignty a nullity;” and (2) “the Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to enforce their 
criminal laws against their own members.”  Id. at 214-15 (internal citations omitted). 
154. Id. at 215. 
155. Id. at 218 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (6th ed. 1990)). 
156. Id.  “It is quite arguable the essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim of an 
external government.”  Id. 
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[the Court’s] cases.”157  Justice Thomas then followed Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence and concluded that both the Executive Branch and the Legis-
lative Branch believe that the tribes possess inherent authority to prosecute 
nonmember Indians.158 
In my view these authoritative pronouncements of the political 
branches make clear that the exercise of this aspect of sovereignty 
is not inconsistent with federal policy and therefore with the 
position of the tribes.  Thus, while Duro may have been a correct 
federal-common-law decision at the time, the political branches 
have subsequently made clear that the tribes’ exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction against nonmember Indians is consistent with federal 
policy.  The potential conflicts on which Duro must have been 
premised, according to the political branches, do not exist.159 
Although Justice Thomas expressed strong reservations regarding the 
opinion of the Court, he concluded that the alternative espoused by Justice 
Souter was also logically untenable.160  Justice Thomas, struck by the fact 
that both Justice Souter and the Eighth Circuit concluded that the decision 
in Duro had constitutional underpinnings, would not adopt their reasoning.  
He was unwilling to reach the conclusion that prior federal common law 
decisions limiting tribes authority to exercise their inherent sovereignty be 
construed as a constitutional holding that Congress could not alter.161 
Yet, similar to Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas offers a glimpse of the 
possibility of change.162  He challenged the Court to admit that it was 
 
157. Id. at 219. 
158. Id. at 222. 
159. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 223-24. 
161. Id.  Justice Thomas found equally troubling the fact that the opinion of the Court did not 
find any provision of the Constitution that would grant to Congress the authority to alter tribal 
sovereignty.  Id. at 224.  Justice Thomas did not agree that the Indian Commerce Clause provides 
plenary powers for Congress to legislate Indian affairs at their whim.  Id. 
162. Id. at 215-16.  Justice Thomas began his concurrence by noting the conflicting 
precedent in the area of tribal sovereignty and constitutional law, and stated: 
I write separately principally because the Court fails to confront these tensions, a result 
that flows from the Court’s inadequate constitutional analysis.  I cannot agree with the 
Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate 
the “metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.”  Unlike the Court, I cannot locate such 
congressional authority in the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the 
Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
Id. at 215 (internal citations omitted).  Justice Thomas later stated “I believe that we must examine 
more critically our tribal sovereignty case law.  Both the Court and the dissent, however, com-
pound the confusion by failing to undertake the necessary rigorous constitutional analysis.”  Id. at 
223. 
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unable to find a source of Congress’s power to alter Indian tribal 
sovereignty.163  Such an admission 
might allow the Court to ask the logically antecedent question 
whether Congress (as opposed to the President) had this 
power. . . . We might find that the Federal Government cannot 
regulate the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and 
simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sovereigns in any 
meaningful sense.  But until we begin to analyze these questions 
honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have identified will 
continue to haunt our cases.164 
The tone of Justice Thomas’s and Justice Kennedy’s concurrences ring 
hollow as being concurrences in name alone.  They appear more as con-
currences based on the precise facts of this case.  As a result of Lara, there 
remains a glaring hole in federal Indian case law which could have been 
cured while avoiding any issues of the constitutionality of prior federal 
common law as noted below.165 
D. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENT 
Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the 
decision of the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed.  The dissent’s argument 
attempts to logically compel the conclusion the Eighth Circuit reached.166  
Justice Souter noted that the holding in Duro was that “because tribes have 
lost their inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, any subse-
quent exercise of such jurisdiction ‘could only have come to the Tribe’ (if at 
all) ‘by delegation from Congress.’”167  Precedent clearly indicates that 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers absolutely rests on a delega-
tion of federal power, not a relaxation of a prior restraint on inherent power. 
Justice Souter then tried to make clear that the prior case law, deciding 
questions of dependent sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction, and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, was “constitutional in nature.”168  The basic question of 
 
163. Id. at 224.  “The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives 
Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.”  Id. 
164. Id. at 226 (emphasis added). 
165. See infra Part IV, pp. 31-38. 
166. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 231 (2004). 
167. Id. at 227.  Three years after Duro, in South Dakota v. Bourland, the Court clarified that 
“any such ‘delegation’ would not be a restoration of prior inherent sovereignty; . . . ‘tribal 
sovereignty over nonmembers cannot survive without express congressional delegation, and is 
therefore not inherent.’”  Id. at 227 (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 
(1993)).  Bourland was a civil case regarding the regulation of hunting and fishing by non-Indians.  
Bourland, 508 U.S. at 681-82. 
168. Lara, 541 U.S. at 228-29. 
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whether a criminal prosecution was a delegation of federal power “turns on 
just this question of how far a prosecuting entity’s inherent jurisdiction 
extends.”169  According to Justice Souter, to answer that question, the Court 
needed to undertake a constitutional analysis of whether or not an entity is 
an independent or dependent sovereign, which it failed to do.170  “Thus, our 
application of the doctrines of independent and dependent sovereignty to 
Indian tribes in response to a double jeopardy claim must itself have had 
constitutional status.”171 
The most troublesome aspect of the argument pertaining to the consti-
tutional status of prior cases regarding the sovereignty of Indian tribes, 
similar to the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, is that it does not rest on any 
specific clause of the Constitution.  Essentially, the holding of the Court 
was that Congress, as the ultimate arbiter of federal common law, has the 
power to amend it.172  In Lara, at both the Eight Circuit and the Supreme 
Court level, the reasoning that espoused a constitutional underpinning for 
its decision was flawed.  Even so, the theory behind those constitutional 
arguments, that only law, not history may be amended is sound, and fits 
with the facts of the case and prior precedent.  Justice Souter’s analysis 
deals with the two weakest aspects of the majority opinion in that the result 
provided by Justice Souter is both rational (i.e., it would not allow for the 
seemingly “unfair” result presented in the hypothetical) and does not give 
credence to revisionist history.  Further, Justice Souter states that this 
federal delegation of authority will fill any jurisdictional gap that may have 
been present, as the government argued, when Duro was decided.173 
Many would argue that such a conclusion is nothing more than looking 
at the ends desired and then justifying the means by which they are ob-
tained.  Even so, the Supreme Court in Duro supported this conclusion.174  
 
169. Id. at 229 (citing Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907)). 
170. Id. at 229. 
When we inquire “whether the two [prosecuting] entities draw their authority to 
punish the offender from distinct sources of power,” . . . we are undertaking a constitu-
tional analysis based on legal categories of constitutional dimension (i. e. [sic], is this 
entity an independent or dependent sovereign?).  Thus, our application of the doctrines 
of independent and dependent sovereignty to Indian tribes in response to a double 
jeopardy claim must itself have had constitutional status. 
Id.  (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)).  Justice Souter also stated his fear that 
the legacy of Lara would cause further confusion in an area of case law already lacking in clarity 
due to the Court’s “failure to stand by what . . . [it has] previously said reveals that [its] concep-
tualizations of sovereignty and dependent sovereignty are largely rhetorical.”  Id. at 230. 
171. Id. at 229. 
172. Id. at 199-210 (explaining the Court’s reasoning). 
173. Id. at 223-30. 
174. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697-98 (1990). 
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The validity of the decision was only questioned when Congress attempted 
to reinterpret its policies regarding the sovereignty of the Indian tribes. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
As noted above, there are several problems in both the majority’s and 
dissent’s conclusion and analysis.  Principally, when does the relaxation of 
powers, to the point of actually increasing prior powers, amount to delega-
tion?  According to the Court’s opinion in Lara, never.  The conclusion that 
it compels is that Congress could, tomorrow, amend 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) to 
state that Indian tribes never had inherent sovereignty to try nonmember 
Indians.  Though the declaration would again reverse the “history” of tribal 
sovereignty, according to Lara, that would be a legitimate exercise of 
congressional power. 
With the strength and recentness of past precedent that had held that 
any change in the inherent status of tribal sovereignty would necessarily be 
a delegation of power, it is remarkable to follow the Court’s reasoning in 
reaching its conclusions in Lara.  Further, there are racial undertones in a 
decision such as this one, even though no racial animosity was intended.175  
The Court’s decision ultimately leads to the deeper questions of who is an 
Indian and who deserves to be subject to additional prosecution for equiv-
alent conduct as a result of that classification.  There does not appear to be 
any public policy in favor of granting Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians.  There are two policy arguments that are general-
ly put forth: (1) such power will increase the strength of tribal sovereignty; 
and (2) it will fill a jurisdictional void that left when Duro prohibited tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed on the reservation by 
nonmember Indians. 
A relaxation on the restraints on tribal sovereignty does appear to 
increase tribes’ inherent jurisdiction.176  In fact, as Lara is written, Congress 
can further expand on the tribes’ inherent jurisdiction and still characterize 
it as a relaxation.  Therefore, due to this relaxation of a prior restriction, the 
 
175. The distinction between an Indian and non-Indian is essentially a racial classification.  
The decision in Lara reinforces the importance of race as the dispositive factor in a line of case 
law that has long suffered from racial bias.  See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 674 (noting that no 
discussion of the foundation of constitutional law is complete “without a full reckoning of the 
racism inherent in the holdings or the racism of the reasoning behind the holdings”).  See also 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 14 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I cannot but think 
that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet ‘state,’ to a people so low 
in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.”) (emphasis added). 
176. Ipso facto, by removing a limitation on the scope of tribal jurisdiction, the reach of that 
jurisdiction has been increased.  See Washburn, supra note 29, at 807, n.158 (recognizing 
Congress’s authority to relax prior restrictions on the scope of tribal jurisdiction). 
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Indian tribes were indeed granted increased sovereignty.  The question of 
why Lara is wrongly decided is answered in part by analyzing who bears 
the cost of this increased sovereignty.  The federal government is not ceding 
any authority by allowing the tribes an increased scope of sovereignty, nor 
is any of the states.  The true bearer of cost of this increased sovereignty 
happens to be any person who subjected to the jurisdiction of an Indian 
tribe who will, solely because of his or her race, face dual prosecution.  In 
the initial hypothetical scenario, the Cherokee and the non-Indian deserve 
equal punishment as none has a greater degree of culpability.  But that will 
not be the outcome.  Understandably, the Oglala member, being a part of 
the tribal community, is subject to its jurisdiction.  The Cherokee member, 
like the non-Indian, is not a member of that community, however, since 
Congress has, as Justice Kennedy noted, affirmatively decided to treat all 
Indians as “fungible groups of homogenous persons,” the Cherokee 
member will face dual prosecution.177 
The second policy argument, that granting Indian tribes criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers will fill the jurisdictional void left by Duro, 
lacks merit.  Congress is free to fill this jurisdictional void by granting such 
power directly to the tribes.  However, once that power is delegated to the 
tribes, it must be treated as a delegation, and any subsequent federal 
prosecution would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
There are at least three potential solutions, unlikely as they may be, to 
resolve the existing confusion in tribal sovereignty case law presented by 
Lara.  The first would be to further expand the scope of tribal jurisdiction to 
recognize the fact that tribal governments and legal systems have advanced 
greatly and provide competent legal systems.  A second possible, though 
equally unlikely, solution would be for Congress to amend the ICRA and 
explicitly state that the amendment is to be construed as a delegation of new 
authority.  The final potential solution, which is also the cleanest, easiest to 
implement, but most unlikely, would be for the Supreme Court to accept 
another case similar to Lara and overrule itself on the basis that history 
cannot be amended. 
A. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION FOR INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS 
If the quality of the tribal court system and processes were proven to be 
fair, efficient and effective, territorial jurisdiction could be granted to the 
tribal courts for all misdemeanors committed on their territory by both 
Indians and non-Indians.  This approach could offend non-Indians who do 
 
177. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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not look favorably upon Indians being granted the authority to try non-
Indians for a criminal offense, and it could also offend those who believe 
that the tribal court systems are too lenient in their sentencing.  Indeed, 
tribal courts lack the authority to hand out sentences greater than the 
maximum currently imposed, which is one year of incarceration, a fine of 
$5000, or both.178  Congress sets the maximum which may be modified at 
any time.  The present limits represent an upward increase from the prior 
limits of imprisonment of six months, or a fine of $500 or both.179 
The other primary argument against such an expanse of jurisdiction, 
essentially, that non-Indians should not be tried by Indian tribal courts, is 
functionally and socially different.  Though all tribes could certainly do as 
the tribes did in Oliphant and post notices that all entering the territory are 
subject to their jurisdiction and thereby provide notice of the fact that the 
tribes are claiming jurisdiction, the essential objection presented by those 
non-Indians who do not wish to face tribal court jurisdiction remains the 
same—they refuse to submit to an entity which they do not perceive as a 
separate sovereign. 
Even though the risk of a sovereign exercising jurisdiction over an 
individual by virtue of presence in that territory is, after all, the same risk 
one runs by driving through a neighboring state,180 and even though tribal 
courts grant procedural protections which are subject to judicial challenge if 
insufficient, the fundamental social basis that exists for resisting such a 
change is likely to impede any such modification.  Regardless of the 
strength of any such biases, the fact remains that contact-based jurisdiction 
in the Indian tribes’ territories would present the fairest and simplest 
solution to the current state of the law under Lara. 
B. DELEGATED AUTHORITY RESULTING IN SINGLE PROSECUTIONS 
WITH EQUAL PENALTIES 
A second, equally unlikely, alternative is for Congress to again amend 
the ICRA to state that the prior amendment to the Act was a delegation and 
not a relaxation of a prior restraint.  As Congress presented testimony, how-
ever self-serving, specifically on this issue, it is unlikely that it will revisit 
 
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2007). 
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2007). 
180. See Burham v. Sup. Ct. of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (reaffirming the prece-
dent that “[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American 
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present 
in the State”). 
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the issue.181  Nevertheless, Congress should revisit the issue because the 
holding in Lara provides that any future grant of power will be held to be a 
relaxation of a prior restraint is illogical and will yield future litigation and 
case law on the subject matter.  It is imperative for both the Congress and 
the courts to speak with one voice on this issue to avoid further confusion 
and expense. 
Significantly, Congress should declare that the authority over nonmem-
ber Indians was indeed a delegation of powers.  As a consequence, little 
would be lost in the arena of criminal jurisdiction and law enforcement on 
the reservation.  Furthermore, a racial inequity based on whether or not one 
is classified as an Indian would be solved.  Fears of the severity or fairness 
of sentences could be allayed if Congress would set sentencing guidelines 
for tribal courts.  By amending § 1301(2) in this way, the result in the 
hypothetical presented in Part I would be that the non-Indian and Cherokee 
member would be tried in separate forums due to the ICRA’s classification 
based on Indian status, but with similar penalties under a sentencing guide-
line structure that would equate with their degree of culpability.  The Oglala 
member, as a result of his membership in the tribe, would rightly be the 
only individual required to face two separate trials under the theory of dual 
sovereignty. 
The result, though imperfect due to a continued lumped classification 
of Indians, is better than the current situation under Lara.  At the very least, 
the Oglala member is tried by his peers in a system he understands, in front 
of a court system that is not foreign to him.  There is not the sense of injus-
tice in the Oglala member being tried twice, due to his membership in the 
tribe, as there would be in the Cherokee member being tried twice solely on 
the basis of being congressionally classified as an Indian. 
The crux of the matter, and the reason the hypothetical stirs emotion, is 
the notion of fairness and also the idea that a jury of peers shall try an 
 
181. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (“The Committee of the Conference 
notes that . . . this legislation is not a delegation of this jurisdiction but a clarification of the status 
of tribes as domestic dependent nations.” (citing e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3-4 (1991) (Conf. 
Rep.)); accord H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 7 (1991); see also S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 4 (1991) 
(“[R]ecogniz[ing] and reaffirm[ing] the inherent authority of tribal governments to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”); 137 CONG. REC. 9445, 9446 (1991) (remarks of Sen. 
Inouye) (“[The] premise [of the legislation] is that the Congress affirms the inherent jurisdiction 
of tribal governments over nonmember Indians.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 10,712-10,714 
(remarks of Rep. Miller, House manager of the bill) (the statute “is not a delegation of authority 
but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly taken away” and the bill “recognizes an 
inherent tribal right which always existed”); Id. at 10,713 (remarks of Rep. Richardson, a sponsor 
of the amendment) (“[The] legislation . . . reaffirms Indian tribes’ criminal misdemeanor 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. . . .”). 
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accused.182  By trying a Cherokee member due to his Indian heritage in the 
Oglala system, both the notions of fairness and of a jury trial by peers are 
violated.  This result should not be the desired outcome of the amendment 
to the ICRA, and for these reasons alone the Act should be amended. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS—WHERE DO WE GO FROM 
HERE? 
Assuming, arguendo, that Oliphant, Wheeler, and Duro were decided 
as federal common law cases, does that necessarily dictate the outcome in 
Lara?  The answer must be no.  As the Court noted, the context of federal 
common law is different from both statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion.  In this case, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 is important to the decision of the case, 
but what the decision ultimately turns on is history.183  As the Lara decision 
turns on history, and the Supreme Court passed once on the argument, the 
opportunity to implement the final alternative solution may have already 
passed. 
The Court had it right when it said that Congress can change the 
federal common law regulating tribal sovereignty,184 but it should only be 
able to change it in most cases.  Congress should be able to fix the result in 
Duro to permit tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, though 
it should properly be classified as a delegation.  It should be recognized, 
though, that Congress does not have the power to change history, as it was 
allowed to do in Lara.185 
 
182. U.S. CONST. amend VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”).  Though the constitutional protection of a trial by a jury of one’s peers is not 
present in the Constitution, the idea has been ingrained in the lexicon of United States legal 
opinions.  See, e.g., In re Tiffany Green, No. 96-022, 1996 WL 660949, at *1 (E.D.P.A., Nov. 15, 
1996) (“The right to a trial by jury of one’s peers is one of the cornerstones of the American 
judicial system.  It is a birthright cherished by generations of American citizens.”); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of 
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt, or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”). 
183. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B (noting that the 
Eighth Circuit in Lara refused to allow Congress to amend history rather than federal common 
law).  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that Congress, having the authority to amend federal 
common law, had the authority to do so in a manner that allows them to state that the former law 
never was as it was.  See Lara, 541 U.S. at 206-07.  “[W]e do not read any of these cases as 
holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian law 
through . . . [the amendment to the ICRA].”  Id. at 207. 
184. Lara, 541 U.S. at 206-07.  The Court recognized in the past that the Supreme Court had 
decided cases based on several sources of authority, including specifically, congressional 
legislation.  Id. at 206.  “And that source was subject to change.”  Id. 
185. Id. 
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The Court did not need to base the holdings in past tribal authority 
cases on the Constitution, which was a major weakness in the argument of 
both the Eighth Circuit, en banc, and Justice Souter.186  Past cases did not 
need to be read as immutable constitutional decisions for Lara to be 
decided differently.  Perhaps the easiest solution, and one which may not be 
unavailable, would have been for the Court to hold that history cannot be 
revised to meet the current desires of Congress.  As stated above, Congress 
should have the authority in dealing with the federal common law to say 
that the law is X, but it should be logically restrained from having the 
authority to say that it was never Y.187 
Basing prior case law on history eliminates the need for the Court to 
classify Congress’s action as a relaxation of prior restraint instead of a new 
delegation of authority.  The Court would still have been able to conclude 
that Congress is the ultimate authority over federal common law, and the 
Court would still have been able to conclude that Congress has plenary 
power over the Indian tribes.  Instead, the Court leaves us with the decision 
in Lara and the certainty that, since almost no uncertainty has been 
resolved, we will be seeing similar cases in the future that continue to 
struggle with the attempt to balance the sovereignty and dependence of a 
people whose authority exists only at the whim of a separate sovereign. 
 
 
186. See id. at 226-31; United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
187. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
